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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between tax avoidance, related party transactions 
and the corporate dividend policy. Furthermore, this study will also investigate the moderating effects 
of the implementation of Corporate Governance (CG) on the relationship between tax avoidance, 
Related Party Transactions (RPT) and corporate dividend policies. Our sample covers companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2011-2014. The results provide moderate support for 
the proposed hypotheses. First, the greater tax avoidance that a company makes will increase the size 
of the firm's RPT. Second, the higher that the company's RPT is, this will lower the company's cash 
dividend payout rate. Third, the greater the tax avoidance is, the lower the company's cash dividend 
payout rate will be, which is done through a related party transaction. Fourth, the impact of the 
implementation of strong CG will weaken the positive relationship between corporate tax avoidance 
and the company’s RPT size, strengthen the negative relationship between the RPT’s size and the cash 
dividend payout policy of the firm, and strengthen the negative relationship between the company’s 
tax avoidance and the company's cash dividend payout policy which is mediated by the company’s 
RPT. This study makes three contributions. First, this study shows an indirect relationship between tax 
avoidance and cash dividend payments, mediated by RPT. Second, this study tries to examine the 
effect of CG’s moderation on the relationship between tax avoidance and RPT, as well as the effect of 
CG’s moderation on the relationship between tax avoidance and cash dividend payments, mediated by 
RPT. Third, this study developed RPT measurements by looking at the RPT’s components more 
specifically (looking at components of transactions outside of the main business of the company - the 
"others" component). 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 30, 2016, the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia issued Regulation (of the 
Finance Minister) PMK No. 213 PMK.03/2016 
regulating the types of documents and/or 
additional information that must be kept by 
taxpayers conducting transactions with related 
parties or through management procedures. This 
regulation aims to reduce tax avoidance by 
multinational companies through transfer pricing 
schemes. 
Transfer pricing is the price charged by one 
subunit of the company for products or services 
rendered to other subunits within the same 
company (Horngren et al., 2012). The amount of 
this transfer price can be appropriate or not, 
according to the market price. By conducting 
transfer pricing schemes, companies can shift 
profits from the company to its related parties. 
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This may be detrimental to the interests of the 
non-controlling shareholders, because reducing 
the firm’s profits will lower the rate of return on 
investment the non-controlling shareholders 
receive in the form of dividends.  
This is according to a statement issued by 
Prastowo (2017), a taxation observer of the 
Center for Taxation Analysis (CITA), which 
states that a transaction mechanism of transfer 
pricing is generally performed by an affiliated 
company that aims to reduce its earnings, so its 
payment of tax and the distribution of dividends 
will be low. But unquestionably, this statement 
must still be proven empirically.  
La Porta et al. (2000) states that corporate 
governance is a mechanism that can reduce the 
information asymmetry between the internal and 
external parties, so as to reduce the possibility of 
the expropriation of the non-controlling share-
holders. The monitoring role of good corporate 
governance can be a mechanism that ensures the 
company’s related party transactions are carried 
out with the aim of maximizing efficiency, so it 
can maximize shareholder value.  
Based on the above background, this study 
aims to empirically test the relationship between 
tax avoidance, related party transactions and 
corporate dividend policy. Furthermore, this 
study will also investigate the moderating effect 
of Corporate Governance (CG) on the relation-
ship between tax avoidance, Related Party 
Transactions (RPT) and the firms’ dividend 
policies.  
As far as the author knows, no research has 
examined the relationship of the above three 
variables simultaneously. Previous research has 
examined the relationship between tax 
avoidance, related party transactions and the 
firms’ dividend policies, but this was only 
partially explored (Koestaman and Diyanty 
(2013); Yuniasih et al. (2013); Hartati et al. 
(2014); Su et al. (2014); and Chan et al. (2016)). 
Previous research has not yet tested the 
moderation of CG on the relationship between 
RPT and cash dividend payments, and the effect 
of CG’s moderation on the simultaneous 
relationship between tax avoidance, RPT and 
cash dividends. Most previous studies focused 
on investigating the effects of CG’s moderation 
on RPT relationships with market reactions 
(Cheung et al. (2006); Utama et al. (2010); 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2012)) or company 
values (Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010); Utama & 
Utama (2014); Elkelish (2017)). Koestaman and 
Diyanti (2013) have tested the effect of CG’s 
moderation, but on the relationship between 
family ownership and cash dividend payouts.  
Previous research tended to measure RPT in 
simple terms, where RPT is measured using 
dummy variables (Ge et al. (2010); Utama 
(2010); Yuniasih et al. (2013); Hartati et al. 
(2014)). However, there have been several 
studies that tested RPT by using its monetary 
amounts, i.e. Utama (2015), who decomposed 
RPT’s components into RPT associated with the 
components of Assets and Liabilities (RPTAL) 
and with components of Sales and Expenses 
(RPTSE), and Chan et al. (2016) who has tested 
tunneling in China and found that tunneling is 
mostly done through the RPT components of 
other receivables.  
This study makes three contributions. First, 
this study shows an indirect relationship between 
tax avoidance and cash dividend payments 
mediated by RPT. Second, the study also 
attempts to examine the effect of CG’s 
moderation on the relationship between tax 
avoidance and RPT, as well as the effect of CG’s 
moderation on the relationship between tax 
avoidance and cash dividend payments, which is 
mediated by RPT. Third, this study develops the 
RPT’s measurements (Utama, 2015) by looking 
at the RPT’s components more specifically 
(looking at components of transactions outside 
of the main business of the company - the 
"other" component (Chan et al., 2016))  
Furthermore, this study will describe the 
literature review and hypotheses development, 
and describe the method, data sources and an 
analysis of the empirical research models, as 
well as an analysis of the test results. Finally, the 
conclusions and implications of this study will 
be presented. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Tax Avoidance and Related Parties 
Transactions  
A tax avoidance transaction is an action taken by 
a company to minimize its corporate tax 
liability. According to the traditional view, tax 
avoidance is seen as an action that can increase 
the value of a company. This is because the 
taxes saved can be reinvested and/or returned to 
the shareholders. However, from an agent's 
perspective, tax avoidance can lead to the 
transfer of wealth or resources from shareholders 
to managers, or from non-controlling share-
holders to controlling shareholders (Desai et al., 
2007; Chan et al., 2016). Such tax avoidance 
actions may provide cash resources that can be 
transferred from the company to its manager, or 
from the non-controlling shareholders to the 
controlling shareholders.  
The transfer of resources that can be 
detrimental to non-controlling shareholders is 
called a tunneling action. Examples of tunneling 
actions, to name a few include: The expro-
priation of company assets, transfer pricing to 
related parties, the sale of assets to the 
controlling shareholder at a price which is not in 
accordance with the market, and guaranteeing 
debt by using the assets of the company 
(Johnson et al., 2000).  
However, the actions of related party 
transactions are not always bad. There are two 
hypotheses underlying the actions of related 
party transactions, the shareholder expropriation 
hypothesis and efficient contracting hypothesis 
(Ryngaerty & Thomas, 2012). If the effects of 
the related party transactions of the company are 
considered detrimental to its shareholders, then it 
is said to support the hypothesis about 
shareholder expropriation. Meanwhile, if the 
company uses the information it has to perform 
related parties transactions that increase the 
shareholders’ value, then it is said to support the 
efficient contracting hypothesis.  
There have been some studies that examine 
the relationship between tax and RPT, either 
directly or indirectly; for example, the research 
conducted by Chen et al. (2010) and Chan et al. 
(2016). Chen et al.’s. (2010) study aimed to test 
whether family enterprises in China are more 
aggressive in tax avoidance. They found that 
family firms turned out to be less aggressive in 
tax avoidance. Chen et al. (2010) suggests that 
this may be because family firms in China are 
willing to lose tax profits to avoid non-tax costs, 
such as the decline in the company's stock price, 
which can happen because the non-controlling 
shareholders think the tax avoidance undertaken 
by the company constitutes a rent-seeking act.  
Research conducted by Chan et al. (2016) 
has directly and empirically examined the 
relationship between tax avoidance and 
tunneling, using Chinese companies as a sample. 
They found that acts of tax avoidance are 
positively associated with tunneling. These 
findings remained consistent despite having 
controlled for the characteristics of the company, 
corporate governance, and institutional factors 
that may also affect tunneling. Chan et al. (2016) 
used the effective tax rates as a proxy of tax 
avoidance actions, and loans to related parties as 
a proxy of tunneling. Loans to related parties 
was selected as the proxy of tunneling associated 
with acts of tax avoidance, with the assumption 
that loans granted to related parties would be 
detrimental to the non-controlling shareholders, 
because the cash proceeds of the tax savings are 
not reinvested. Based on these arguments, this 
study proposes an alternative hypothesis as 
follows: 
H1: Tax avoidance is positively related to the 
related party transactions 
2. Related Party Transactions and Dividend 
Policy  
The proposition of Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
states that, in a world without friction, a 
dividend policy will not affect the shareholders’ 
wealth. However, a dividend policy can lead to 
agency problems within the company. It could 
be either agency problem between controlling 
shareholder of the manager, or non-controlling 
shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984; Faccio et al., 
2001).  
According to the agency-cost models, if the 
company pays a dividend, it will be less than 
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that enjoyed by the controlling shareholder, and 
less of a perquisite that that enjoyed by the 
manager (Su et al., 2014). A cash dividend is the 
expenditure of company resources which is 
made proportionally to the controlling and non-
controlling shareholders. The distribution of 
dividends directly reduces/limits the expropria-
tion made by managers/controlling shareholders 
(Faccio et al., 2001). Therefore, the controlling 
shareholder wishing to expropriate tends to 
avoid dividend payouts.  
One type of expropriation action that a 
controlling shareholder can take is through the 
act of related party transactions. Su et al. (2014) 
conducted a study in China regarding the 
relationship between cash dividend payments 
and related party transactions, particularly loan 
components to related parties. They found a 
negative relationship between the amount of 
related party transactions and cash dividend 
payments. This indicates that a company that 
deals with many related parties will pay less 
cash dividends. Therefore, this study proposes a 
hypothesis in an alternative form as follows: 
H2: The related party transactions negatively 
affect the company's cash dividend payment 
rate. 
Based on the results of the previous research 
described above, it appears tax avoidance acts by 
a company may harm the interests of its non-
controlling shareholders. Non-controlling share-
holders will be disadvantaged, because the 
company’s tax avoidance through a transfer 
pricing scheme with related parties will reduce 
the corporate profits, which in turn will reduce 
the return on investment in the form of the cash 
dividends received by the non-controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, this study proposes a 
third hypothesis in an alternative form as 
follows: 
H3: Through related party transactions, 
corporate tax avoidance will be negatively 
related to the company's cash dividend 
payment rate.  
3. Corporate Governance and the Relation-
ship between Tax Avoidance Actions, 
RPT and Cash Dividend  
La Porta et al. (2000) states that corporate 
governance is a mechanism that can reduce the 
information asymmetry between the internal and 
external parties, so as to reduce the possibility of 
expropriation of the non-controlling share-
holders. The monitoring role of good corporate 
governance can be a mechanism that ensures the 
company related party transactions aim to 
maximize shareholders’ value. Klapper and 
Love (2004) state that the application of 
corporate governance is important for companies 
located in countries with weak law enforcement 
conditions, where the legal tools to protect the 
rights of non-controlling shareholders are poor.  
Research related to the moderating role of 
corporate governance mechanisms has produced 
differing results. Lestari et al. (2014) found that 
the mechanism of a company’s corporate 
governance weakens the positive relationship 
between tax planning and firm value. This 
suggests that tax planning and corporate 
governance mechanisms have a substitution 
effect, where tax planning will be required at 
companies with a low quality of corporate 
governance. Diyanty et al. (2013) found that 
strong corporate governance practices are proven 
to prevent the entrenchment effect of the amount 
of related party transactions. While Utama and 
Utama (2013) have not been able to find any 
ability by corporate governance mechanisms to 
moderate the relationship between the related 
party transactions with the company's value. 
Koestaman and Diyanty (2013) found that the 
corporate governance mechanism of a company 
cannot protect the expropriation of its non-
controlling shareholders. Based on the findings 
of this previous research, this study proposes a 
fourth hypothesis in an alternative form as 
follows: 
H4a:  A CG mechanism will moderate the 
relationship between tax avoidance and the 
amount of related party transactions. 
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H4b:  A CG mechanism will moderate the 
relationship between the related party 
transactions with the company's cash 
dividend payment rate.  
H4c: A CG mechanism will moderate the 
relationship of tax avoidance and the 
company's cash dividend payout rate, which 
is mediated by the amount of related party 
transactions. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
1. Sample  
The sample used in this study is the 100 
companies with the largest market capitalization 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) 
in the period from 2011 to 2014. This period was 
chosen because of the availability of data; the 
financial data were obtained from www.idx.co.id 
or taken directly from the companies’ websites. 
For the corporate governance data, this study 
used CG scorecard data issued by the Indonesian 
Institute for Corporate Directorship. 
2. Measurement of Variables  
Tax Avoidance 
The Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is one of the 
most common measurements used to measure 
tax avoidance actions by a company (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). This study uses the current 
ETR to measure corporate tax avoidance. 
According to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), the 
use of the current ETR may reflect the deferral 
strategy of the company and reflects the tax 
avoidance that is not in accordance with the 
applicable regulations (reflecting non-
conforming avoidance). The current ETR is 
calculated by dividing the value of the current 
income tax expense by the profit before tax 
value. 
Related Party Transactions  
Measurements of the related party 
transactions in this study used and developed the 
measurements conducted by Utama (2015) and 
Chan et al. (2016). Utama (2015) divided related 
party transactions into four categories based on 
the groups presented in the financial statements, 
which are the Related Party Transactions of 
Assets (RPTA), Related Party Transactions of 
Liabilities (RPTL), Related Party Transactions 
of Sales and revenue (RPTS) and Related Party 
Transactions of Expenses (RPTE). While Chan 
et al. (2016) measured related party transactions 
based on the value of the other accounts 
receivable, because the results of the study in 
China found that the act of tunneling is mostly 
done through other receivables transactions. 
Therefore, this study divides the transactions 
related parties into six categories: RPT related to 
Assets (RPTA), Liabilities (RPTL), Sales and 
revenues (RPTS), Expenses (RPTE), Other 
Receivables (RPTA_OR), and Non-operating 
liabilities (RPTL_NonOp). The RPT value is 
presented based on the monetary amount. 
Cash Dividend Policy  
This study uses a Dividend Payout ratio 
(DIVPAYOUT) as a proxy of the cash dividend 
policy (Koestaman & Diyanty (2013); La Porta 
et al. (2000)). DIVPAYOUT is the proportion of 
cash dividends paid by the company compared 
to the value of its net income.  
Control Variables  
To ensure that the research’s results are 
really influenced by the variables to be tested, 
this study also controls for the variables that 
have proven to also influence the actions of 
tunneling, which is measured using the RPT. 
The control variables are ROA, SIZE, LEV, 
DACC, BIG4, SOE, GROWTH, FIRST and AGE 
(Chan et al. 2016). ROA is measured by dividing 
the net income by the value of the company’s 
assets. SIZE is a natural logarithm value of the 
total assets. LEV is leverage measured by 
dividing the total value of liabilities by the value 
of the total assets of the company. DACC is a 
residual value of discretionary accruals that is 
measured using a modified cross-sectional 
model of Jones. BIG4 is a dummy variable, 
which is 1 if the company is audited by a big 4 
accounting firm, and 0 if not. SOE is a dummy 
variable, which is 1 if the company is a state-
owned enterprise (SOE), and 0 if it is not. 
GROWTH is the change in the value of sales 
divided by the total assets. FIRST is the 
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percentage of the shares held by the largest 
shareholder. AGE is the length of time that the 
company has been listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange.  
3. Research Model  
To test the first hypothesis, which examines 
the relationship between tax avoidance and the 
amount of Related Party Transactions (RPT), 
this study uses the following research model 
equation:  
RPTit =  β0 + β1ETRit + β2-10VARCONTROLit + 
εit ...(1) 
Where:  
RPT =  value RPTA, RPTA_OR, RPTL, 
RPTL_NonOp, RPTS, and RPTE for firm 
i in year t  
ETR =  current value of ETR for firm i in year t 
VARCONTROL = ROA, SIZE, LEV, DACC, 
BIG4, SOE, GROWTH, FIRST and AGE  
If the hypothesis is proven, the study expects the 
value of ߚଵ  to have a negative direction. The 
smaller that the value of ETR is indicates the 
greater the avoidance of tax that has been 
conducted by the company, and this will create a 
greater value for the amount of RPT.  
Meanwhile, to test the second hypothesis, 
which examines the relationship between the 
amount of RPT and the company's cash dividend 
policy, this study uses the following research 
model equation:  
DIVPAYOUTit = α0 + α1ETRit + α2-
10VARCONTROLit   + εit      (2) 
Where:  
DIVPAYOUT = cash dividend payout ratio of 
firm i in year t  
RPT =  value of RPTA, RPTA_OR, RPTL, 
RPTL_NonOp, RPTS, and RPTE for 
firm i in year t  
VARCONTROL = ROA, SIZE, LEV, DACC, 
BIG4, SOE, GROWTH, FIRST and 
AGE of firm i in year t 
If the hypothesis is proven, the study expects the 
value of ߙଵ  to have a negative direction. The 
greater the value of the RPT, the smaller the cash 
dividend to be distributed.  
To test the third hypothesis, which is to test 
the effect of the magnitude of the mediation by 
RPT on the relationship between tax avoidance 
and the company's cash dividend policy, this 
study uses the following research model 
equation: 
DIVPAYOUTit = α0 + γ1ETRit + γ2 ܴܲෞܶ it +        
γ3-11VARCONTROLit + εit     (3) 
Where:  
DIVPAYOUT = cash dividend payout ratio of 
firm i in year t  
ETR  =  current ETR of firm i in year t  
ܴܲ෣ܶ  = predicted value of RPTA, RPTA_OR, 
RPTL, RPTL_NonOp, RPTS, and RPTE 
resulting from Equation (1) for firm i in 
year t  
VARCONTROL = ROA, SIZE, LEV, DACC, 
BIG4, SOE, GROWTH, FIRST and AGE 
of firm i in year t 
If the third hypothesis is proven, the study 
expects the value of ߛଶ  to have a negative 
direction. Through the RPT, the greater 
avoidance of tax by the company will result in 
reduced cash dividends by the company.  
Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, which 
examines the effect of the moderating 
mechanism of CG on the relationship between 
the act of tax avoidance with the amount of RPT 
(Hypothesis 4a), the relationship between the 
amount of RPT and the level of the payment of 
cash dividends (Hypothesis 4b), and the 
relationship between tax avoidance and cash 
dividends payment which is mediated by RPT 
(Hypothesis 4c), then this research uses the 
following research model equations:  
Hypothesis 4a: 
RPTit = β0 + β1ETRit + β2CGit + β3ETR*CGit + 
β4-12VARCONTROLit + εit     (4) 
Hypothesis 4b: 
DIVPAYOUTit = α 0 + α1RPTit + α2CGit + 
α3RPT*CGit + 
 α4-12VARCONTROLit + εit     (5) 
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Hypothesis 4c: 
DIVPAYOUTit = α 0 + γ1ETRit + γ2 ܴܲෞܶ it + γ3CGit 
+ γ4ETR*CGit + γ5 ܴܲෞܶ *CGit + 
γ6-15VARCONTROLit + εit    (6) 
Where:  
DIVPAYOUT = dividend payout ratio of firm i in 
year t  
ETR  =  current ETR of firm i in year t  
ܴܲ෣ܶ  = predicted value of RPTA, RPTA_OR, 
RPTL, RPTL_NonOp, RPTS, and RPTE 
resulting from Equation (1) for firm i in 
year t  
CG   =  CG scorecard value of firm i in year t  
VARCONTROL = ROA, SIZE, LEV, DACC, 
BIG4, SOE, GROWTH, FIRST and AGE  
 
If Hypothesis 4 is proven, then the expected 
values of βଷ, αଷ	and γହ  in this study should be 
statistically significant. Because the results of 
previous studies have different coefficient 
directions, this study does not predict the 
direction of certain coefficients.  
RESEARCH RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
1. Sample Selection Results  
Criteria samples used in this study are as 
follows: (1) Companies in the top 100 for their 
market capitalization during 2011 to 2014, 
which are also included in the CG scorecard data 
issued by the IICD; (2) always included in the 
IICD data; (3) excluding the financial industry; 
(4) do not have negative profit values; (5) have 
their financial reporting period ending on 
December 31; (6) during the observation period 
have an RPT value. 
The financial industry is excluded in the 
sample because of the nature of the composition 
of its financial statements, which are different to 
those of other industries, so they cannot be 
compared. This research also excluded compa-
nies that have negative earnings because it will 
be difficult to interpret the negative value of 
ETR. Based on the criteria that have been 
mentioned and after removing the outlier 
observations (3 observations), finally this study 
used 195 observations. To ensure that the data 
are normally distributed, this study winsorized 
the data by making the upper and lower limit 3 
times the standard deviation of the mean. A 
summary of sample’s selection can be seen in 
Table 1.  
2. Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistical analysis aims to provide a 
simple description of the data and results of the 
research conducted. Table 2 shows that the 
spread of the companies’ RPT values vary 
greatly and their magnitude is wide. For exam-
ple, the RPTA has a minimum value of 0 and a 
maximum value of Rp2,908,949,581,498.82. 
The average dividend payout ratio is 0.33, while 
the average value of corporate CG is 53.31. 
From the average value of the big 4 it is seen 
that as many as 83% of the sample firms are 
audited by big 4 accounting firms; while for the 
SOE, it shows that only 14% of the sample are 
SOE companies. The condition for big 4 and 
SOE is constant during the observation period 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure 
Sample Criteria Number of Companies Number of Observations 
Included in IICD data (2011-2014)  
Less:  
    Not always included in IICD data  
    Included in the financial industry  
    Has a negative profit  
    Has non-December reporting period  
    Does not have RPT value  
131  
 
(61)  
(16)  
524  
 
(244)  
(64)  
(13)  
(1)  
(4)  
Number of final observations  (198)  
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The largest percentage of ownership in the 
sample companies is 57%. From the ages of the 
companies it appears that the average of the 
sample has been listed on the market for 15 
years. This could lead to sample selection bias, 
in that the sample used in this study are large 
companies that have proven their survival 
ability. 
Table 3 shows that the disclosure of 
corporate RPT mostly consists of RPTA and 
RPTL, respectively at 88.43% and 81.48% of the 
total observations. While Non-operating RPTS 
(RPTS-NonOp) and Non-operating RPTE 
(RPTE-NonOp) data are very small, 23.61% and 
30.56% respectively. Therefore, this study does 
not investigate the non-operating RPTS and non-
operating RPTE any further.  
Table 3: Distribution of RPT data in observation 
Distribution of  
RPT transactions  Number of observations 
RPTA 88.43% 
RPTA-OR 63.89% 
RPTL 81.48% 
RPTL- NonOp 67.59% 
RPTS 68.98% 
RPTS- NonOp 23.61% 
RPTE 65.28% 
RPTE- NonOp 30.56% 
Source: Primary Data processed, 2017 
 
Table 4 Results of Empirical Model Regression Testing Hypothesis 1 
Variable  RPTA  RPTA-OR  RPTL  RPTL-NonOp RPTS  RPTE  
C  -1.30E + 13  (0.000) ***  
-5.87E + 11  
(0.000) ***  
-7.44E + 12 
(0.000) *** 
-1.96E + 12  
(0.000) ***  
-2.39E + 13  
(0.000) ***  
-2.23E + 13  
(0.000) ***  
ETR  -1.53E + 12  (0.014) **  
8.01E + 10  
(0,039) **  
-1.52E + 12 
(0.001) *** 
2.16E + 11  
(0.152)  
2.54E + 12  
(0.125)  
-1.86E + 12  
(0.068) *  
AGE  -6.49E + 09  (0.234)  
-2.50E + 08  
(0.464)  
3.11E + 09  
(0.437)  
2.37E + 09  
(0.075) *  
-1.43E + 10  
(0.324)  
1.21E + 10  
(0.177)  
BIG4  -8.72E + 10  (0.495)  
3.96E + 08  
(0.961)  
7.78E + 09  
(0.934)  
2.19E + 10  
(0.482)  
1.52E + 11  
(0.656)  
9.90E + 10  
(0.638)  
DACC  -2.52E + 11  (0.676)  
6.48E + 10  
(0.088) *  
7.79E + 10  
(0.861)  
1.23E + 10  
(0.933)  
-1.60E + 11  
(0.921)  
1.21E + 12  
(0.227)  
FIRST  4.74E + 11  (0.041) **  
2.23E + 09  
(0.287)  
4.93E + 11  
(0.006) *** 
2.16E + 10  
(0.701)  
2.41E + 12  
(0.000) ***  
1.77E + 12  
(0.000) ***  
GROWTH  -4.05E + 11  (0.231)  
2.26E + 10  
(0.089) *  
3.64E + 11  
(0.147)  
3.37E + 10  
(0.683)  
-1.33E + 12  
(0.141)  
7.27E + 11  
(0.193)  
LEV  -5.01E + 11  (0.086) *  
3.11E + 10  
(0.089) *  
4.62E + 11  
(0.032) **  
1.49E + 11  
(0.036) **  
-9.20E + 11  
(0.237)  
9.31E + 11  
(0.053) *  
ROA  6.83E + 11  (0.226)  
3.25E + 10  
(0.357)  
-1.53E + 11 
(0.711)  
3.56E + 11  
(0.010) ***  
1.60E + 12  
(0.287)  
1.86E + 12  
(0.046) **  
SIZE  4.60E + 11  (0.000) ***  
1.91E + 10  
(0.000) ***  
2.86E + 11  
(0.000) *** 
6.03E + 10  
(0.000) ***  
7.74E + 11  
(0.000) ***  
7.07E + 11  
(0.000) ***  
SOE  1.46E + 12  (0.000) ***  
-4.00E + 10  
(0.000) ***  
4.86E + 11  
(0.000) 888 
-8.16E + 10  
(0.023) **  
1.33E + 12  
(0.000) ***  
4.42E + 11  
(0.069) *  
Adj.R 2  .616  .193  0,407  .207  0.333  0.373  
F-stat  
Prob (F-stat)  
31.607  
(0.000) ***  
5.533  
(0.000) *** 
14.042  
(0.000) *** 
4,705  
(0.000) ***  
10.485  
(0.000) ***  
12.325  
(0.000) ***  
N = 195 observations  
ETR = current ETR; RPTA = related party transaction related to assets, RPTA-OR = related party transaction 
that included in the group of other receivables, RPTL = related parties transactions that included in the group of 
liabilities, RPTL-NonOp = related parties transaction that included in the group of non-operating debt, RPTS = 
related parties transaction that included in the group of sales, RPTE = related party transaction that are included 
in the group of expense.  
Where: *** significant 1%; ** significant 5%; * Significant 10%.  
 Source: Primary Data processed, 2017 
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3. Correlation Test and Normality  
As shown in Appendix 1, the correlation test 
shows that each of the tested variables has 
correlation with the other tested variables, with 
an average value below 0.5. This indicates that 
the test results are free from collinearity 
problems. Statistical descriptive results also 
show that the average skewness value of the 
tested variable is less than 2. This indicates the 
data is normally distributed.  
4. Hypothesis Testing  
Testing of Hypothesis 1 (H 1)  
The result of the empirical model’s 
regression to test the effect of tax avoidance 
action on RPT’s quantity (Hypothesis 1) can be 
seen in Table 4. The table shows that for all the 
categories of RPT, the F-statistic equations have 
Prob. (F-statistic) that are significant (0.0000), 
this suggests that the independent variables 
which were tested together proved significant (α 
= 1%), and they affect the dependent variables 
(RPT). But the adjusted R-squared magnitude of 
each RPT shows different values.  
The highest adjusted R-squared value was 
shown by RPTA (61.6%) and the smallest by 
RPTA-OR (19.3%). This means that the amount 
of RPTA that can be explained by the 
independent variables tested is 61.6%, while the 
remaining 38.4% is explained by other variables 
that are not addressed in this study. As for 
RPTA-OR, 19.3% can be explained by the 
independent variables that were tested, while the 
remaining 80.7% is explained by other variables 
that are also not addressed in this study. 
Table 4 also shows that 4 out of the 6 
categories of RPT show that ETR significantly 
affects the RPT. It showed that ETR affected 
RPTA, RPTL and RPTE in a negatively 
significant manner (with a confidence level of α 
= 5%, 1% and 10%). But for the RPTA-OR test 
results, they indicate different direction 
coefficients, which are positive with a 
confidence level of α = 5%.  
These results indicate moderate support for 
the hypothesis, that the greater the level of tax 
avoidance that companies do (shown by the 
decreasing ETR values), then the amount of 
related party transactions will be also higher. 
This is consistent with the results of research 
conducted by Chan et al. (2016).  
Testing of Hypothesis 2 (H2)  
The results of the empirical model’s 
regression to test the effect of RPT on the 
companies’ cash dividend policy (DIVPAYOUT) 
can be seen in Table 5. The table shows that for 
all the categories of RPT, the value of the F-
statistic equations has Prob. (F-statistic) that are 
significant (0.0000); it suggests that the 
independent variables that were tested together 
are significant (α = 1%), and they affect the 
dependent variables (DIVPAYOUT). But the 
value of the adjusted R-squared of each category 
of RPT shows a relatively small value. As an 
example, RPTA has a value of adjusted R-
squared of 23.9%. This shows that 23.9% of the 
DIVPAYOUT can be explained by the 
independent variables that were tested, while the 
remaining 76.1% is explained by other variables 
that are not addressed in this study.  
Table 5 shows that of all the categories of 
RPT that were tested, only RPTA negatively and 
significantly affected DIVPAYOUT. The others, 
RPTA-OR, RPTL, RPTL-NonOp, RPTS and 
RPTE were not proven to have significantly 
affected DIVPAYOUT. Although they were not 
significant, the coefficient RPTA-OR, RPTL, 
RPTL-NonOp and RPTS showed a negative 
direction, which is in accordance with the 
predicted direction. 
Overall, the results of this study are only 
able to provide a little support for the hypothesis, 
which is that the amount of related party 
transactions undertaken by a company 
negatively affects the company's cash dividend 
payment policy. 
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Table 5 Results of Empirical Model Regression Testing Hypothesis 2 
Variable  DIVPAYOUT  
C  
-0.795  
(0.228)  
-0.538  
(0.391)  
-0.536  
(0.406)  
-0.293  
(0.635)  
-0.286  
(0.648)  
-0.176  
(0.793)  
RPTA  
-4.81E-14  
(0.048) *       
RPTA-OR  
 
-6.07E-13  
(0.120)      
RPTL  
  
-4.24E-14  
(0.192)     
RPTL-NonOp  
   
-5.89E-14  
(0.561)    
RPTS  
    
-4.53E-15  
(0.624)   
RPTE  
     
2.52E-17  
(0.998)  
AGE 
0.001  
(0.563)  
0.001  
(0.490)  
0.001  
(0.418)  
0.001  
(0.405)  
0.001  
(0.468)  
0.001  
(0.449)  
BIG4  
0.013  
(0.754)  
0.0191  
(0.651)  
0.018  
(0.667)  
0.019  
(0.643)  
0.019  
(0.653)  
0.018  
(0.667)  
DACC  
-0.281  
(0.151)  
-0.253  
(0.199)  
-0.269  
(0.173)  
-0.285  
(0.149)  
-0.286  
(0.148)  
-0.283  
(0.155)  
FIRST  
0.309  
(0.000) ***  
0.300  
(0.000) ***  
0.314  
(0.000) ***  
0.296  
(0.000) ***  
0.306  
(0.000) ***  
0.294  
(0.000) ***  
GROWTH  
-0.197  
(0.079) *  
-0.166  
(0.138)  
-0.165  
(0.143)  
-0.177  
(0.116)  
-0.185  
(0.102)  
-0.179  
(0.114)  
LEV  
-0.139  
(0.144)  
-0.105  
(0.270)  
-0.098  
(0.309)  
-0.112  
(0.243)  
-0.125  
(0.192)  
-0.120  
(0.214)  
ROA  
0.700  
(0.000) ***  
0.676  
(0.000)  
0.663  
(0.000) ***  
0.680  
(0.000) ***  
0.667  
(0.000) ***  
0.660  
(0.000) ***  
SIZE  
0.030  
(0.158)  
0.021  
(0.294)  
0.020  
(0.318)  
0.013  
(0.514)  
0.013  
(0.523)  
0.009  
(0.664)  
SOE  
0.100  
(0.098) *  
0.003  
(0.948)  
0.050  
(0.328)  
0.023  
(0.636)  
0.034  
(0.494)  
0.028  
(0.563)  
Adj.R 2  0.239  0.190  0.229  0.224  0.180  0.222  
F-stat  
Prob (F-stat)  
5.664  
(0.000) ***  
5.467  
(0.000) *** 
5.375  
(0.000) *** 
5.198  
(0.000) *** 
5.186  
(0.000) ***  
5.155  
(0.000) *** 
N = 195 observations  
ETR = current ETR; RPTA = related parties transaction included in the group of assets, RPTA-OR = related 
parties transaction that are included in the group of other receivables, RPTL = related parties transaction that 
included in the group of liabilities, RPTL-NonOp = related parties transaction that included in the group of 
non-operating debt, RPTS = related parties transaction that included in the group of sales, RPTE = related party 
transaction that are included in the group of expense.  
Where: *** significant 1%; ** significant 5%; * Significant 10%.  
 Source: Primary Data processed, 2017  
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Table 6 Results of Empirical Model Regression Testing Hypothesis 3 
Variable  DIVPAYOUT  
C  -8.96E + 13  
(0,005) **  
-1.234108  
(0.421)  
ETR  -0.035  
(0.872)  
0.161  
(0.612)  
RPTA-P  -3.47E-12  
(0.005) ***   
RPTL-P  
 
-1.26E-13  
(0.448)  
VARCONTROL  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R 2  0.231  0.189  
F-stat  
Prob (F-stat)  
6.201  
(0.000) ***  
5.038  
(0.000) ***  
N = 195 observations  
ETR = current ETR; RPTA-P = value of predicted related party transaction included in 
the group of assets, RPTL P = value of predicted related party transaction in the group of 
liabilities.  
Where: *** significant 1%; ** significant 5%; * Significant 10%.  
Source: Primary Data processed, 2017 
 
Testing of Hypothesis 3 (H3)  
The results of the empirical model’s 
regression to test the mediating effect of RPT on 
the relationship between tax avoidance (ETR) 
and the company's cash dividend policy 
(DIVPAYOUT) can be seen in Table 6. 
Regression testing of the third hypothesis can 
only be done for the RPT categories RPTA-P and 
RPTL-P (the value of RPT is predictive from the 
results of Equation 1). This is due to the other 
RPT variables having collinearity problems.  
If we look at Table 6, it is seen that for the 
categories RPTA and RPTL, the value of the F-
statistic equations has Prob. (F-statistic) that are 
significant (0.0000), it suggests that the 
independent variables that were tested together 
were significant (α = 1%), and influenced the 
dependent variables (DIVPAYOUT). But the 
value of the adjusted R-squared for each 
category of RPT shows a relative small value. As 
an example, RPTA has a value for its adjusted R-
squared of 23.1%. This shows that 23.1% of the 
DIVPAYOUT can be explained by the 
independent variables that were tested, while the 
other 76.9% is explained by other variables that 
are not addressed in this study. 
Table 6 also shows that the coefficient 
RPTA-P has a negative direction and is 
significant, and affects DIVPAYOUT. Whereas 
the coefficient RPTL-P, although not able to 
show any significant results in influencing 
DIVPAYOUT, has a direction that is consistent 
with the predictions (a negative direction). It 
indicates that the companies’ tax avoidance can 
reduce the value of their cash dividends 
distributed to shareholders, and this act is done 
through a related party transaction. But overall 
the study was only able to provide a little 
evidence for the influence of RPT’s mediation 
on the relationship between tax avoidance and 
the companies’ cash dividend policies. 
Testing Hypotheses 4a (H4a)  
Table 7 shows the results of the empirical 
model’s regression to test the moderating 
influence of CG on the relationship between the 
magnitude of the tax avoidance action and RPT 
(Hypothesis 4a). The table shows that for all the 
categories of RPT, the value of the F-statistic 
equations has Prob. (F-statistic) that is signi-
ficant (0.0000), it suggests that the independent 
variables that were tested together are significant 
(α = 1%) and affect the dependent variables 
(RPT). But the magnitude of the adjusted R-
squared of each RPT shows different values. The 
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highest adjusted R-squared is RPTA (61.8%) and 
the smallest is RPTL-NonOp. (15.7%). 
The interaction coefficient between ETR and 
CG (ETR*CG) shows that the significant value 
is only visible with the categories RPTA-OR and 
RPTS, which both have a significance level of α 
= 5%. However, the direction coefficients of the 
two categories look different, RPTA-OR shows a 
negative direction, while RPTS shows a positive 
value. It suggests a moderate support for the 
hypothesis, that CG moderates the relationship 
between tax avoidance and related party 
transactions. 
 The result of Hypothesis 4a testing indicates 
that strong CG practices will be able to reduce 
the expropriation actions conducted by a 
company through RPTA-OR (it supports Chan et 
al.’s (2016) result), but this effect does not occur 
in RPTS. It is assumed to occur because the 
related parties’ sales tend to be for efficiency 
purposes, so that the application of good CG will 
strengthen this relationship. 
Testing Hypothesis 4b (H4b)  
The results of the empirical model’s 
regression to test the moderating effect of CG on 
the relationship between the amount of RPT and 
the company's cash dividend policy (Hypothesis 
4b) can be seen in Table 8. The table shows that 
for all the categories of RPT, the values of the F-
statistic equations has Prob. (F-statistic) that are 
significant (0.0000), this suggests that the 
independent variables that were tested together 
are significant (α = 1%) and affect the dependent 
variables (RPT). But the magnitude of the 
adjusted R-squared of each RPT shows a 
relatively small value with different magnitudes. 
The highest adjusted R-squared is shown by 
RPTA (20%) and the smallest is RPTA-OR 
(10.5%). 
  
Table 7 Results of Empirical Model Regression Testing Hypothesis 4a 
Variable  RPTA  RPTA-OR  RPTL  
RPTL-
NonOp
RPTS RPTE  
C  
-1.35E + 13  
(0.000) ***  
-6.73E + 11  
(0.000) ***  
-8.96E + 12  
(0.000) ***  
-1.96E + 12  
(0.000) ***  
-2.08E + 13  
(0.000) ***  
-2.22E + 13  
(0.000)  
ETR  
2.63E + 12  
(0.342)  
4.84E + 11  
(0.005)  
2.77E + 11  
(0.893)  
1.60E + 10  
(0.981)  
-1.49E + 13  
(0.043) **  
-4.62E + 12  
(0.313)  
CG  
2.06E + 10  
(0.092) *  
1.30E + 09  
(0.085) *  
5.79E + 09  
(0.526)  
-1.68E + 09  
(0.576)  
-6.88E + 10  
(0.034) **  
-1.93E + 10  
(0.34)  
ETR * CG  
-7.63E + 10  
(0.120)  
-7.21E + 09  
(0.018) **  
-3.00E + 10  
(0.414)  
3.86E + 09  
(0.748)  
3.15E + 11  
(0.016) **  
5.21E + 10  
(0.520)  
VARCONTROL  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R 2  0.618  0.269  0.402  0.157  0.348  0.411  
F-stat  
Prob (F-stat)  
26.70  
(0.000) ***  
5.47  
(0.000) ***  
11.69  
(0.000) ***  
3.954  
(0.000) ***  
9.456  
(0.000) ***  
10.37  
(0.000) ***  
N = 195 observations  
ETR = current ETR; RPTA = related party transaction included in the group of assets, RPTA-OR = related 
party transaction that are included in the group of other receivables, RPTL = related party transaction included 
in the group of liabilities, RPTL-NonOp = related party transaction included in the group of non-operating 
debt, RPTS = related party transaction included in the group of sales, RPTE = related party transaction 
included in the group of expense.  
Where: *** significant 1%; ** significant 5%; * Significant 10%.  
 Source: Primary Data processed, 2017  
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Table 8 Results of Empirical Model Regression Testing Hypothesis 4b 
Variable DIVPAYOUT 
C -0.637 
(0.334) 
-0.419 
(0.52) 
-0.377 
(0.563) 
0.019 
(0.976) 
-0.160397 
(0.983) 
-0.006891 
(0.992) 
RPTA -2.06E-13 
(0.024) ** 
     
RPTA-OR  -9.24E-13 
(0.57) 
    
RPTL   -1.97E-13 
(0.096) * 
   
RPTL-NonOp    1.06E-14 
(0.149) 
  
RPTS     -9.40E-14 
(0.022) 
 
RPTE      -3.17E-14 
(0.538) 
CG 0.000267 
(0.85) 
0.000946 
(0.52) 
0.000324 
(0.82) 
0.000409 
(0.77) 
0.000142 
(0.919) 
0.000933 
(0.515) 
RPTA * CG 2.63E-15 
(0.07) * 
     
RPTA-OR * CG  6.95E-15 
(0.82) 
    
RPTL * CG   2.56E-15 
(0.169) 
   
RPTL-NonOp * CG    -6.34E-13 
(0.175) 
  
RPTS * CG     1.50E-15 
(0.026) ** 
 
RPTE * CG      5.92E-16 
(0.501) 
VARCONTROL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R 2 0.20 0.105 0.190 0.184 0.198 0.176 
F-stat 
Prob (F-stat) 
5.14 
(0,000) *** 
4.58 
(0,000) *** 
4.728 
(0,000) *** 
4.582 
(0,000) *** 
4.922 
(0,000) *** 
4.402 
(0,000) *** 
N = 195 observations  
ETR = current ETR; RPTA = related party transaction included in the group of assets, RPTA-OR = related party 
transaction included in the group of other receivables, RPTL = related party transaction included in the group of 
liabilities, RPTL-NonOp = related party transaction parties included in the group of non-operating debt, RPTS = 
related party transaction included in the group of sales, RPTE = related party transaction included in the group 
of expense.  
Where: *** significant 1%; ** significant 5%; * Significant 10%.  
Source: Primary Data processed, 2017 
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Table 8 shows that the interaction variable 
between CG and RPT (RPT * CG) has a positive 
and significant value when measured by the 
categories RPTA and RPTS. This indicates that a 
strong CG will strengthen the negative 
correlation between RPT and the companies’ 
policies on providing cash dividends.  
Given that companies in Indonesia generally 
have a high concentration of ownership 
(Claessens et al. 2000), then any dividend 
payments will be greatly enjoyed by the 
controlling shareholders. The application of a 
strong CG can reduce the expropriation of the 
non-controlling shareholders’ interests.  
Testing Hypotheses 4c (H4c)  
Table 9 shows the results of empirical testing 
to examine the moderating effect of CG on the 
relationship between tax avoidance and the 
companies’ cash dividend policies that are 
mediated by RPT (Hypothesis 4c). As with the 
third test, this study is only able to perform 
regression testing of the RPT on the categories 
RPTA-P and RPTL-P. This is due to the other 
RPT categories having collinearity problems. 
 
Table 9 Results of Empirical Model Regression Testing Hypothesis 4c 
Variable DIVPAYOUT 
C  -44.06324  
(0.001) ***  
-1.310620  
(0.441)  
ETR  -0.629318  
(0.491)  
-0.884706  
(0.405)  
CG  0.003553  
(0.378)  
-0.004552  
(0.335)  
ETR * CG  0.011531  
(0.467)  
0.017757  
(0.309)  
RPTA-P  -3.62E-12  
(0.001) ***  
 
RPTA-P * CG  3.40E-15  
(0.052) *  
 
RPTL-P   -4.52E-13  
(0.105)  
RPTL-P * CG   4.93E-15  
(0.146)  
VARCONTROL  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R 2  0.239  0.19  
F-stat  
Prob (F-stat)  
5.27  
(0.000) ***  
4.19  
(0.000) ***  
N = 195 observations  
ETR = current ETR; RPTA-P = predicted value of related party transaction 
included in the group of assets, RPTL P = predicted value of related party 
transaction in the group of liabilities. CG = CG index.  
Where: *** significant 1%; ** significant 5%; * Significant 10%.  
Source: Primary Data processed, 2017 
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In accordance with the results of Hypothesis 
4b’s testing, Hypothesis 4c’s testing results also 
show that the application of a strong CG looks to 
strengthen the negative relationship between tax 
avoidance and the companies’ cash dividend 
policies that are made through a RPT. This is 
indicated by the coefficient of the interaction 
variable RPTA-P * CG which has a positive 
direction and is significant (α = 1%). Although 
the interaction variable RPTL-P * CG does not 
have a significant effect, it has a positive 
direction.  
5. Sensitivity Test 
To ensure that the results of this study are 
robust, researchers have replaced the 
measurement of ETR by using the GAAP ETR, 
measure, by dividing the total tax expense with 
earnings before tax. The examination results 
show they are relatively equal to the main test 
results. This study has also attempted to replace 
the companies’ cash dividend policies measures 
with the amount of cash dividends distributed by 
the companies. However, the test results show 
lower significance values than testing using the 
dividend payouts ratios as a measure of their 
dividend policies.  
CONCLUSION 
This study aimed to empirically test the 
relationship between tax avoidance, the amount 
of related party transactions and companies’ 
dividend policies. Furthermore, this study will 
also investigate the moderating effect of 
Corporate Governance (CG) on the relationship 
between tax avoidance, the Related Party 
Transactions (RPT) and the companies’ dividend 
policies. 
This study has three contributions. First, this 
study showed a direct relationship between tax 
avoidance and the payment of cash dividends 
which are mediated by RPT. Second, the study 
also sought to examine the moderating effect of 
CG on the relationship between tax avoidance 
and RPT, as well as CG’s moderating effect on 
the relationship between tax avoidance with the 
payment of a cash dividend, which is mediated 
by the RPT. Third, this study developed the 
measurement of RPT (Utama, 2015) by looking 
in a more specific manner at RPT’s components 
(see transactions components outside the main 
business of the company - the component’s 
"other" (Chan et al. 2016)). This study uses six 
categories of RPT, those are RPTA (the RPT 
category that includes the assets), RPTA-OR (the 
RPT category that includes a group of other 
receivables), RPTL (the RPT category that 
includes a group of liabilities), RPTL-NonOp. 
(the RPT category that includes a group of non-
operating liabilities), RPTS (the RPT category 
that includes the sales and revenue) and RPTE 
(the RPT category that includes the expenses).  
This study showed moderate support for the 
first hypothesis, that the greater that the 
avoidance of tax is (shown by the decreasing 
amount of ETR value), then the amount of 
related party transactions will also be higher. 
Results from testing the second hypothesis show 
that the amount of related party transactions by a 
company is negatively related to the company's 
cash dividend payment policy, but this is also 
only partially proven (evidence exists only when 
testing is done using RPTA categories). The 
results of the test of the third hypothesis show 
that the RPT will mediate the relationship 
between the act of tax avoidance and the cash 
dividend policy, but this is also only supported 
by a little evidence, that is, only if the RPT was 
measured using the RPTA-P categories (RPTA 
prediction value results from regression of 
Equation 1).  
Examination of the moderating capabilities 
of CG on the relationship variables were tested, 
however this study found only moderate 
evidence to support the hypothesis. Hypothesis 
4a’s testing results indicate that a strong CG will 
be able to reduce the expropriation actions that 
companies take through RPTA-OR, but this 
effect does not occur in RPTS. It is assumed to 
occur because the related parties’ sales tend to 
be for efficiency purposes, so that the appli-
cation of good CG will strengthen this 
relationship.  
Hypothesis 4b’s testing results indicate that a 
strong CG will strengthen the negative 
correlation between RPT and the companies 
206 Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business September 
policies to provide cash dividends (the results 
were obtained when using a RPTA-P category 
measurement). Given that the companies in 
Indonesia are companies with high ownership 
concentrations, then the dividend payment will 
be greatly enjoyed by the controlling 
shareholders. The application of a strong CG can 
reduce the expropriation of the non-controlling 
shareholders’ interests. Results of hypothesis 
4c’s testing also show the same results as 
Hypothesis 4b, it shows that a strong CG looked 
to strengthen the negative relationship between 
tax avoidance and the companies’ cash dividend 
policies which are made through related party 
transactions (the results were obtained when 
using the measurements of the RPTA-P 
category). 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION, 
LIMITATION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The results of this study have several 
implications. First, the moderate support for the 
hypotheses suggests that firms carry out tax 
avoidance through related party transactions. It 
supports the implementation of PMK 
No.213/PMK.03/2016, which regulates for the 
additional documentation and/or information 
relating to related party transactions. Second, the 
application of a strong CG looks to reduce the 
expropriation of the non-controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, the companies should 
implement good CG mechanisms.  
This study has several limitations. First, the 
test is only performed on those companies that 
fall within the 100 largest market capitalizations 
during the observation period. Increasing the 
number of samples will increase the ability of 
the results to be generally acceptable. Second, 
the regression testing using the full sample does 
not distinguish whether the observation has a 
value from a specific category or not. Future 
studies should include regression testing with a 
selected sample, which is tested only with an 
observation that has its RPT value categories 
tested. For example, testing RPTA only using the 
observations that have a RPTA value, and 
exclude any observations that have had none of 
their RPT categories tested. 
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